TECHNICAL NOTE—Robust Newsvendor Competition Under Asymmetric Information by Jiang, Houyuan et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Operations, Information and Decisions Papers Wharton Faculty Research
1-2011
TECHNICAL NOTE—Robust Newsvendor
Competition Under Asymmetric Information
Houyuan Jiang
Serguei Netessine
University of Pennsylvania
Sergei Savin
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers
Part of the Other Business Commons, and the Other Economics Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/oid_papers/115
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jiang, H., Netessine, S., & Savin, S. (2011). TECHNICAL NOTE—Robust Newsvendor Competition Under Asymmetric
Information. Operations Research, 59 (1), 254-261. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0858
TECHNICAL NOTE—Robust Newsvendor Competition Under
Asymmetric Information
Abstract
We generalize analysis of competition among newsvendors to a setting in which competitors possess
asymmetric information about future demand realizations, and this information is limited to knowledge of the
support of demand distribution. In such a setting, traditional expectation-based optimization criteria are not
adequate, and therefore we focus on the alternative criterion used in the robust optimization literature: the
absolute regret minimization. We show existence and derive closed-form expressions for the robust
optimization Nash equilibrium solution for a game with an arbitrary number of players. This solution allows
us to gain insight into the nature of robust asymmetric newsvendor competition. We show that the
competitive solution in the presence of information asymmetry is an intuitive extension of the robust solution
for the monopolistic newsvendor problem, which allows us to distill the impact of both competition and
information asymmetry. In addition, we show that, contrary to the intuition, a competing newsvendor does
not necessarily benefit from having better information about its own demand distribution than its competitor
has.
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Robust Newsvendor Competition
Houyuan Jiang∗, Serguei Netessine†, and Sergei Savin‡
June 2007
Abstract
We analyze competition among newsvendors when the only information competitors pos-
sess about the nature of future demand realizations is the support of demand distributions.
In such a setting, traditional expectation-based optimization criteria may not be adequate.
In our analysis, we focus on several alternative criteria used in the robust optimization lit-
erature, such as relative and absolute regret, as well as worst-case performance. Using these
robust criteria, we establish the unique Nash equilibrium solution for a (symmetric) game
with an arbitrary number of players. In addition, we obtain closed-form, intuitive expres-
sions for the optimal order quantities which allow us to gain insight into the nature of robust
competition. We show that the ex-ante and ex-post versions of the competitive newsvendor
problem are equivalent under the worst-case or the absolute regret or the relative regret cri-
terion. Numerical analysis indicates that, among different robust approaches, absolute regret
minimization offers the most sensible alternative when demand distribution is unknown.
Keywords: Robust optimization, newsvendor competition, absolute regret, relative regret.
∗Judge Business School, University of Cambridge.
†The Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania.
‡Graduate School of Business, Columbia University.
1 Introduction
Classical operations management models often assume that a decision maker has complete knowl-
edge of the distributions of uncertain parameters (typically, consumer demand for products or
services). This is a sensible assumption for most mature products when historical demand infor-
mation is available and there is sufficient reason to believe that future demand distribution can
be forecasted using historical information. Even in cases when historical demand information is
unavailable and the product is new, expert judgments can be solicited to predict the distribution
of future demand. However, in many practical settings such an approach is either impractical or
unreliable. For example, expert predictions of demand uncertainty are known to be biased (see,
for example, Soll and Klayman [30]) and very little is known about experts’ ability to predict
the shape of the demand distribution. Realization of such limitations has led in recent years
to the rapid development of a new kind of stochastic optimization paradigm which is based on
the notion of “robustness.” A robust solution typically ensures a certain level of performance
irrespective of the underlying distributions of the involved random parameters.
The difficulty in forecasting demand for a single product is most extreme in multi-item prob-
lems, one example of which is stock-out-based demand substitution. In the classical incarnation
of this problem consumers arrive with a product preference in mind (we call this the primary
demand). If their primary product is out of stock, consumers may substitute it with one of
the alternatives (the secondary demand). Demand substitution is pervasive, for example, in
retail situations, and its importance is well-documented. A recent survey of retailers has found
that, of the customers who do not find what they want on the shelf, 40% either defer the pur-
chase or go to a competitor store to find the item (see Andraski and Haedicke [2]). Naturally,
demand substitution needs to be accounted for when optimizing inventory management. For
this purpose, extensive literature on demand substitution has been developed which relies on the
knowledge of the joint probability of the primary demand distribution as well as the substitution
behavior of consumers. Naturally, estimation of such joint multivariate demand distribution is
a non-trivial task even in the presence of historical demand information. The reason is that the
retailer is typically unable to observe whether the product has been purchased because it was
the first-choice product or because the customer substituted some other out-of-stock product.
These practical considerations drive our effort to apply a robust optimization approach to the
multi-item inventory model with demand substitution.
As a basis of our analysis, we use the demand substitution model pioneered by McGillivray
and Silver [18] and first studied in the competitive framework by Parlar [23]. In this model,
consumers arrive with a product preference in mind, and a fixed proportion of these consumers
wishing to purchase product i substitute product j for it if product i is out of stock. We focus on
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the competitive, single-period version of this problem, which is often referred to as “competitive
newsvendors.” Instead of assuming that the primary demand distribution is known, we base
our analysis only on the assumption that the support for the primary demand distribution is
known. We then use several robust optimization criteria to find the Nash equilibrium of this
game. Specifically, we use the maximin approach, the absolute (ex-post and ex-ante) regret
minimization, and the relative (ex-post and ex-ante) regret minimization. We show that the
maximin approach is unsatisfactory for analyzing this game because it results in the same solu-
tion with and without competition. On the other hand, both the absolute and the relative regret
minimizations produce closed-form solutions which are amenable to interpretations. Moreover,
we show that, although the absolute and the relative regret solutions differ, ex-ante and ex-post
solutions coincide for each of these two regret alternatives. These solutions can be interpreted
as intuitive modifications of the noncompetitive newsvendor solution. Numerical experiments
indicate that the absolute regret minimization approach is quite sensible in that, while produc-
ing robust outcomes, it also results in solutions that are not far off from the solution obtained
when demand distribution is known and the expected profit is maximized. Thus, we argue,
robust optimization approaches are instrumental in gaining deeper insights into the newsven-
dor competition problem. The key contribution of this paper is in that it not only develops a
methodology to study the newsvendor competition problem in settings where only the support
of the demand distribution is known but also shows that this seemingly more difficult problem
often possesses a solution more tractable than the solution of the problem with known demand
distribution.
2 Literature Survey
Two research streams that are closely related to our work study, respectively, demand substi-
tution under competition and robust stochastic optimization. Studies of demand substitution
in the context of single-period models with demand uncertainty were pioneered by McGillivray
and Silver [18]. A large number of papers followed this cornerstone work but we only survey
papers in this stream that focus on strategic interactions under demand substitution. Parlar [23]
is the first paper to study demand substitution under competition for two players. Wang and
Parlar [32] extend this analysis to three players while Netessine and Rudi [20] generalize it
to an arbitrary number of players. Kraiselburd et al. [14] study contracting in a supply chain
when retailers compete through demand spillovers. Netessine and Zhang [22] generalize this
analysis to complementary products, and Netessine and Shumsky [21] analyze competition with
spillovers between two airlines that segment customers into two classes. In addition to the
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widely studied basic model of McGillivray and Silver [18], other, more sophisticated models of
demand substitution have been proposed (e.g., Lippman and McCardle [16], Mahajan and van
Ryzin [17], and Bernstein and Federgruen [6]). However, in our analysis we focus on the most
basic model of demand substitution. Two papers, Anupindi et al. [3] and Kok and Fisher [13],
offer demand estimation procedures for substitution models but under centralized inventory
management. These papers indicate that accurate demand estimation is far from trivial even
for centralized inventory management of substitutable products.
The extant literature offers several robust optimization approaches. The earliest is probably
the maximin approach of Scarf [29], who investigates a firm’s decision to select an order quantity
to maximize its worst-case profit under demand uncertainty. Scarf assumes that only mean and
standard deviation of future demand is known. Scarf [29] and, later, Gallego and Moon [10]
demonstrate that the worst-case distribution is discrete with two mass points and obtain the
expressions for the optimal order quantity and for the resulting profit. To correct for the overly
conservative nature of such an approach to profit maximization, Ben-Tal and Nemirovski [5]
and, later, Bertsimas and Sim [8] employ the notion of “budget of uncertainty.”
An example of a less conservative robust optimization criterion is the so-called minimax-
regret introduced by Savage [28]. Under this criterion, a firm minimizes the maximum absolute
regret of making a suboptimal decision. In the stochastic inventory model the absolute regret
can be defined before or after the demand realization which results, respectively, in ex-ante or
ex-post versions of regret minimization. Morris and Yi [19], Kasugai and Kasegai [12], and
Vairaktarakis [31] study the notion of minimax absolute ex-post regret for the newsvendor
problem. Perakis and Roels [24] and Yue et al. [33] study the minimax absolute ex-ante regret
newsvendor problem and derive the optimal order quantities in the presence of limited demand
information, such as the moments (mean and variance) or the shape (support, symmetry and
unimodality) of the demand distribution. Perakis and Roels [25] point out that the minimax
absolute ex-ante regret approach parallels the entropy maximization studied by Jaynes [11] and
hence is intuitively appealing. Eren and Maglaras [9] use entropy maximization to update the
booking limits for a revenue management problem while obtaining demand information.
A third variety of the robust profit optimization deals with the notion of relative regret. Zhu
et al. [34] derive the optimal order quantities in the newsvendor model under the relative regret
criterion when support of the distribution and either mean or the standard deviation of demand
are known. Ball and Queyranne [4] use relative regret in the context of a single-leg revenue
management problem. This work is extended by Lan et al. [15] who consider both relative and
absolute regrets and propose new static and dynamic booking control policies for a single-leg,
multiple-fare class problem in cases when only upper/lower bounds on demand are available.
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As is evident from our survey, analysis of robust policies has been almost exclusively limited
to the monopolistic setting with a couple of exceptions. Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] introduce
the notion of robust games based on the worst-case analysis. They show the existence of mixed-
strategies Nash equilibria with or without private information, compute mixed-strategies Nash
equilibria, and provide comparisons between robust and Bayesian games. Another exception is
Perakis and Roels [26], who study a two-echelon supply chain under unknown demand distribu-
tion and price-only contract. This paper is, perhaps, the closest to ours, because in one instance
(section 6) Perakis and Roels study a supply chain with symmetric competing newsvendors. But
Perakis and Roels [26] assume that demand distribution possesses the increasing generalized fail-
ure rate property whereas we assume that the support of the distribution is known. Furthermore,
they do not model demand overflow/substitution and instead reallocate excess demand using
an approach similar to the one in Lippman and McCardle [16]. In another related paper, Lan
et al. [15] study the single-leg revenue management problem under both the absolute and the
relative regret minimization criteria and, similar to our work, assume that only the support of
the demand distribution is known.
3 The Model
Consider a market populated byN newsvendors, each selling a different product. For newsvendor
i = 1, ..., N , we denote the product selling price and procurement costs by pi and ci, respectively.
We assume that customers arrive with a product preference in mind so that each newsvendor
faces random primary demand denoted by Di with the support [Ai, Bi]. Moreover, if product
i is out of stock, a proportion oji of customers unsatisfied by newsvendor i “spills over” to
(substitutes) newsvendor j. We will assume throughout that
∑
j 6=i oji ≤ 1 for any i = 1, ..., N .
Given the set of product order quantities Q = (Q1, ..., QN ) selected by newsvendors at the
beginning of the period and the set of potential demand distributions F = (F1, ..., FN ), the total
expected profit for newsvendor i is given by
Πi(Q,F) = −ciQi + piEF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
]
, (1)
where DEi = Di+
∑
j 6=i oij(Dj −Qj)+ is the effective demand for newsvendor i, which accounts
for the demand spillover from other newsvendors. For convenience, we will denote by
[
Ai, B
E
i
]
support of demand distribution for DEi where B
E
i = Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj − Qj)+. We will use
D to denote the domain for the demand distributions F. Note that (1) reduces to the clas-
sical newsvendor profit functions when oij = 0 for all j 6= i. For the game-theoretic analysis
below, it is convenient to introduce the following commonly used “i−centered” notation for
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Q = (Q1, ..., QN ) and F = (F1, ..., FN ): Q = (Qi,Q−i) and F = (Fi,F−i). In traditional analy-
sis of the newsvendor game (see Netessine and Rudi [20]) newsvendor i selects Qi to maximize
her expected profit by solving the following maximization problem:
max
Qi≥0
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F), ∀i (2)
in which Q−i and F are assumed to be given. Here we revisit the solution of this problem:
Proposition 1 For the newsvendor game defined in (2):
(a) (Netessine and Rudi [20]) For any known continuous demand distribution F, there exists
a Nash equilibrium solution Q∗ satisfying the following optimality equations:
P (Di ≤ Q∗i )− P
Di < Q∗i < Di +∑
j 6=i
oij(Dj −Q∗j )+
 = (pi − ci) /pi, ∀i. (3)
(b) Consider a symmetric two-player game with uniformly distributed demand: i.e., let Ai =
A, Bi = B, ci = c, pi = p, and oij = γ, i, j = 1, 2. Then the unique Nash equilibrium is
Q∗ =
 B + (B −A)
(
1−√1 + 2γc/p) /γ, if (2 + 3γ)p ≥ 2c(1 + γ)2,
A+ (B −A)√2γ(p− c)/ ((1 + 2γ)p), otherwise. (4)
In particular, when γ = 0, Q∗ = (c/p)A+ (1− c/p)B.
We state Proposition 1 to illustrate two points. First, if demand distribution is known, the
equilibrium solution is quite complex and can be stated only implicitly: one must solve a system
of simultaneous equations (3) with each equation involving multidimensional integrals over the
regions that themselves depend on the values of decision variables. Likewise, any parametric
sensitivity analysis is quite complex in this case because it requires implicit differentiation of
the system of equations. The second part of Proposition 1 illustrates that, when the simplest
possible distributional form (the uniform distribution), as well as problem symmetry is assumed,
the problem becomes more tractable, although even in this case one has to worry about differ-
ent solutions in certain parameter ranges. This example with uniform demand distribution is
useful because, without the effect of competition through demand spillovers, absolute regret
minimization in the newsvendor problem coincides with the solution that uses uniform demand
distribution (see also Vairaktarakis [31]). As will be evident shortly, this is not the case in
competitive models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4 studies a newsvendor game under
the worst-case (or maximin) criterion. We prove that, under this criterion, the ex-ante maximin
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problem and the ex-post maximin problem are equivalent and then show that the solution with
and without competition is the same. In section 5.1, we introduce a newsvendor game in which
participants minimize the absolute ex-ante regret and find its solution. In section 5.2, we prove
the equivalence between the newsvendor games under the absolute ex-post and ex-ante regret
minimization criteria. In section 6.1 we analytically solve a minimax relative ex-post regret
problem, and in section 6.2 we show that a minimax relative ex-ante regret problem is equivalent
to a maximin relative ex-post regret problem. Computational comparisons between the robust
approaches and the traditional approach which maximizes expected profits are presented in
section 7. We conclude with a summary of our findings in section 8.
4 The Maximin (Worst-Case) Approach
We begin with the most conservative of all robust optimization approaches, the maximin crite-
rion. Under the ex-ante maximin approach, newsvendor i determines the optimal order quantity
by solving the following optimization problem:
max
Qi≥0
(
min
F∈D
(−ciQi + piEF[min(DEi , Qi)])) , (5)
hence the term “maximin.” Clearly, this approach is very conservative in that the newsvendor
seeks protection against the worst possible outcome. Likewise, under the ex-post maximin
approach, newsvendor i determines the optimal quantity by solving the following optimization
problem:
max
Qi≥0
(
min
D∈[A,B]
(−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi))) . (6)
The following proposition establishes equivalence of these two formulations and finds the
Nash equilibrium order quantities.
Proposition 2 (a) The optimal value for the ex-ante maximin problem (5) is attained at a
point in the interval [Ai, BEi ].
(b) The optimal value for the inner minimization problem of (5) is achieved at F such that
for newsvendor i, Fi has a discrete distribution with a unit impulse at Ai.
(c) Both ex-ante and ex-post maximin problems are equivalent in the sense that for newsvendor
i, both problems have the same objective function with respect to Qi and hence the same
unique Nash equilibrium solution, such that Q∗i = Ai, ∀i.
We see that the Nash equilibrium solution under the maximin criterion is somewhat unap-
pealing: essentially, each firm’s stocking quantity is set at the point of lowest possible demand
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realization. This solution essentially ignores demand substitution and competition – indeed, it
is easy to demonstrate that a stand-alone newsvendor would stock inventory in a similar way.
Moreover, any N newsvendors under the centralized inventory management would stock inven-
tory in the exact same way. We conclude that the overly conservative nature of the maximin
criterion may limit its applicability when modeling competitive situations such as ours.
5 Absolute Regret Criterion
In this section we apply the absolute regret criterion to the newsvendor competition problem.
This robust optimization approach was studied in the context of the classical newsvendor prob-
lem by Vairaktarakis [31] and further developed by Perakis and Roels [24].
5.1 Absolute Ex-Ante Regret
We define the absolute ex-ante regret for newsvendor i as
∆eai (Q,F) = maxbQi≥0
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)−Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
)
. (7)
Given this definition, the minimax absolute ex-ante regret minimization problem for newsvendor
i can be stated as follows:
Rea (Q−i) = min
Qi≥0
(
max
F∈D
(∆eai (Q,F))
)
. (8)
Reverting the order of the two maximizations in (8), we obtain an equivalent formulation:
min
Qi≥0
(
maxbQi≥0
(
max
F∈D
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)−Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
)))
= min
Qi≥0
(
maxbQi≥0
(
ci(Qi − Q̂i) + pimax
F∈D
(
EF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
− EF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
])))
. (9)
The feasible regions for both Qi and Q̂i in the optimization problems (7) and (9) can be reduced
as shown in the following lemma:
Lemma 1 (a) The optimal value for the optimization problem with respect to Q̂i is attained at
a point in the interval [Ai, BEi ], ∀i.
(b) The optimal value for the optimization problem with respect to Qi is attained at a point
in the interval [Ai, BEi ], ∀i.
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In view of this result, we can simplify the problem, which now becomes
min
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
(
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
ci(Qi − Q̂i) + pimax
F∈D
(
EF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
− EF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
])))
.
(10)
In the following proposition we solve the inner maximization problem in (10) analytically.
Proposition 3 Consider two sets of order quantities {Qi} and
{
Q̂i
}
such that Ai ≤ Qi ≤ BEi
and Ai ≤ Q̂i ≤ BEi for all i, and define the set of values
{
D̂i
}
such that
Q̂i = D̂i +
∑
j 6=i
oij(D̂j −Qj)+. (11)
Further, consider a particular joint probability distribution F̂ for the demand of all newsven-
dors such that F̂i is a unit impulse probability distribution with mass at D̂i for all i. Then F̂ is
the optimal solution to the inner maximization problem of the minimax absolute ex-ante regret
problem (10): maxF∈D
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)−Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
)
.
This finding is consistent with Perakis and Roels [24] and Bertsimas and Popescu [7], who
show that the inner maximization problem in (10) is equivalent to a moment-bound problem so
that the distribution achieving the maximum regret is discrete with a single mass point. If we
use this observation, the following proposition identifies the Nash equilibrium in this problem
and is the key result of this section.
Proposition 4 (a) The best response function of newsvendor i is uniquely determined by Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai + pi−cipi B
E
i .
(b) There exists a Nash equilibrium solution satisfying the following system of nonlinear and
non-smooth equations:
Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai +
pi − ci
pi
Bi +∑
j 6=i
oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
 ,∀i. (12)
Note that (12) generalizes the solution to the classical newsvendor problem under the regret
minimization criterion, which can be obtained by letting oij ≡ 0, ∀i, j. In this case, QNVi =
ci
pi
Ai+ pi−cipi Bi,∀i, a solution that coincides with that of Vairaktarakis [31]. This solution can be
thought of as the weighted average of the lower and the upper bounds on demand distribution.
As Vairaktarakis notes, this solution can also be obtained by assuming that demand distribution
is uniform on [Ai, Bi]. Note, however, that the competitive newsvendor solution differs from the
solution obtained in Proposition 1 that uses the uniform demand distribution. Instead, the
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upper bound Bi is increased to BEi to account for substitution. It is easily verified that each
competing newsvendor stocks a higher quantity than QNVi because of the higher upper bound
on demand distribution. As is evident from Proposition 4, absolute regret minimization allows
us to obtain a simple yet intuitive solution for the competitive newsvendor problem. However,
even this simple solution is implicit, since equilibrium decisions appear both on the left- and the
right-hand side of (12). In two special cases we are able to obtain closed-form solutions for this
game with an arbitrary number of players.
Proposition 5 (a) Suppose that∑
j 6=i
oijcj
pj
(Bj −Aj) ≤ ci
pi − ci (Bi −Ai),∀i. (13)
Then Q∗i ≤ Bi and the unique Nash equilibrium Q∗ can be obtained as follows. Define
A =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 o12(1− c1p1 ) ... o1N (1− c1p1 )
o21(1− c2p2 ) 1 ... o2N (1− c2p2 )
... ... ... ...
oN1(1− cNpN ) oN2(1−
cN
pN
) ... 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
Bi =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 o12(1− c1p1 ) ... o1,i−1(1− c1p1 ) σi1 ... o1N (1− c1p1 )
o21(1− c2p2 ) 1 ... o2,i−1(1− c2p2 ) σi2 ... o2N (1− c2p2 )
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
oN1(1− cNpN ) oN2(1−
cN
pN
) ... oN,i−1(1− cNpN ) σiN ... 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
where σij =
piBi−ci(Bi−Ai)
pi
+ (1− cNpN )
∑
j 6=i oijBj. Then the equilibrium solution is:
Q∗i =
detBi
detA
,∀i. (14)
(b) There exists at least one newsvendor i0 such that Q∗i0 ≤ Bi0.
(c) Consider a symmetric game, such that Ai = A, Bi = B, ci = c, pi = p, and oij = o, ∀i, j,
and let p̂ = p+ o(p− c) (N − 1) . Then, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
Q∗i =
c
p̂
A+
p̂− c
p̂
B, ∀i. (15)
In (a), we have a closed-form solution to the game in a case when each optimal stocking
quantity does not exceed the upper bound on the primary demand distribution. This assumption
is quite reasonable in settings where substitution proportions oij are relatively small. In these
9
settings, the solution is obtained by solving a system of linear equations. In (b) we show
that at least one stocking quantity will not exceed the upper bound on the primary demand
distribution. This result is intuitive: all newsvendors together would not stock more than the
upper bound on the aggregate demand. Finally, in (c) we have a simple closed-form solution for
the symmetric game. Such a simple solution arises from considering cases (a) and (b) together:
when the problem is symmetric, it is easy to demonstrate that all equilibrium order quantities
will not exceed upper bounds on the primary demand and, therefore, the solution in (a) applies.
Furthermore, this solution takes a particularly intuitive form: it replicates the simple newsvendor
solution but with an adjusted price p̂ that accounts for demand substitution. This dependence
results in simple comparative statics: the equilibrium stocking quantity is clearly increasing in p̂
and hence it is also increasing in substituting fraction o and the number of newsvendors (N−1),
approaching the upper bound B on demand distribution. To conclude this section, we obtain
a closed-form solution for a problem with arbitrary cost/revenue parameters but with only two
newsvendors.
Proposition 6 Let N = 2, and for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, define
oij =
(
ci/pi
1− ci/pi
)
(Bi −Ai)
(Bj −Aj) cj/pj . (16)
Note that it is impossible to have both oij > oij and oji > oji.
(a) If oij ≤ oij and oji ≤ oji, the unique Nash equilibrium is
Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai +
(
1− cipi
)
Bi +
(
1− cipi
)
cj
pj
oij(Bj −Aj)−
(
1− cipi
)(
1− cjpj
)
oijojiBi
1−
(
1− cipi
)(
1− cjpj
)
oijoji
, i = 1, 2.
(17)
Furthermore, Q∗i ≤ Bi and Q∗j ≤ Bj.
(b) If oij ≤ oij and oji > oji, the unique Nash equilibrium is
Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai +
(
1− ci
pi
)
Bi,
Q∗j =
cj
pj
Aj +
(
1− cj
pj
)
Bj +
(
1− cj
pj
)
oji
ci
pi
(Bi −Ai). (18)
Furthermore, Q∗i ≤ Bi and Q∗j > Bj.
The last proposition provides additional insights into the equilibrium solution for asymmet-
ric newsvendors. Threshold values for substitution fractions (16) play the same role as condi-
tion (13): when both substitution fractions are small enough, as in case (a), both competing
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newsvendors select stocking quantities exceeding the newsvendor solution but lower than the
upper bound on the primary demand. The solution in this case is obtained by evaluating (14)
and the resulting expression is quite easy to interpret. The first two terms in the numerator
ci
pi
Ai +
(
1− cipi
)
Bi reflect the classical newsvendor solution that the newsvendor would follow
when faced with the primary demand only. The third term
(
1− cipi
)
cj
pj
oij(Bj − Aj) accounts
for demand overflow from retailer j to retailer i. Clearly, the stocking quantity is higher if more
customers are willing to substitute (higher oij), if support of demand distribution for retailer j
is bigger (higher Bj−Aj), if retailer i earns a higher margin or if retailer j earns a lower margin
(because in this case retailer j stocks less and there is a higher likelihood of overflow demand).
Finally, the fourth term
(
1− cipi
)(
1− cjpj
)
oijojiBi indicates that the stocking quantity is re-
duced because of substitution from retailer i to retailer j resulting in a higher stocking quantity
for retailer j and, as a result of competitive interactions, lower demand and stocking quantity
for retailer i. In case (b), when substitution fractions are asymmetric (one higher and one lower
than the thresholds), one of the newsvendors elects to stock more than the upper bound on
its primary demand. Thus, the second newsvendor does not expect any demand spillovers and
elects to stock the classical newsvendor quantity QNVi . Clearly, in this case the solution does
not depend on one of the substitution fractions, oij . This simple and intuitive reflection of com-
petitive interactions is not available in newsvendor competition models that assume knowledge
of demand distribution (Netessine and Rudi [20], Lippman and McCardle [16]).
5.2 Absolute Ex-Post Regret
As opposed to the ex-ante regret, the ex-post regret is determined after the demand realization is
known. In this subsection we demonstrate that the ex-post absolute regret minimization problem
results in the same solution as the ex-ante absolute regret minimization problem and hence the
same insights apply. In particular, it is easy to see that, given inventory levels Q−i for all other
newsvendors and demand realization D = (D1, · · · , DN ), the best policy for newsvendor i is to
order a product quantity DEi = Di+
∑
j 6=i oij(Dj−Qj)+ in order to match supply with demand
exactly. This policy produces (pi− ci)DEi in profits and any deviation from this amount will be
the ex-post regret. Thus, we can formally define the absolute ex-post regret for newsvendor i as
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)− Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D) = (pi − ci)DEi − pimin(DEi , Qi) + ciQi, (19)
where Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D) = pimin(DEi , Qi) − ciQi and Q̂i = DEi . We then define the minimax
absolute ex-post regret minimization problem for newsvendor i as
min
Qi≥0
(
max
D∈[A,B]
(
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)− Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D)
))
. (20)
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Proposition 7 concisely states the solution to (20):
Proposition 7 There exists a Nash equilibrium solution to the minimax absolute ex-post regret
problem satisfying Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai + pi−cipi B
E
i , ∀i. Moreover, minimax absolute ex-post and ex-ante
regret problems (20) and (8) are equivalent.
As is evident from the last result, the solution to the absolute ex-post regret minimization
problem is equivalent to the solution to the absolute ex-ante regret minimization problem and
therefore all results (Propositions 4-6) remain valid in the absolute ex-post regret setting as well.
6 Relative Regret Criterion
In this section we apply the relative regret minimization criterion to the newsvendor competition
problem. This robust optimization approach was first applied to the newsvendor model by Zhu
et al. [34].
6.1 Relative Ex-Post Regret
The relative ex-post regret is defined after observing demand realization. In this case, given
inventory levels Q−i for all competitors and demand realization D = (D1, · · · , DN ), the best
policy for newsvendor i is to order a quantity of DEi resulting in (pi − ci)DEi in profits for
newsvendor i. We therefore define the relative ex-post regret for newsvendor i as
Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D)
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)
=
pimin(DEi , Qi)− ciQi
(pi − ci)DEi
, (21)
where Q̂i = DEi and Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D) is the same as in Section 5.2. The relative ex-post regret
defined here is similar to the definition in Ball and Queyranne [4]. We further define the maximin
relative ex-post regret minimization problem for newsvendor i as follows:
max
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
(
min
D∈D
(
Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D)
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)
))
. (22)
The analysis of this problem is presented below.
Proposition 8 For the newsvendor game defined by (22), the best response function of newsven-
dor i is uniquely determined by Q∗i =
piAiB
E
i
(pi−ci)Ai+ciBEi
, and a Nash equilibrium solution satisfies
the following system of nonlinear and non-smooth equations:
Q∗i =
piAi
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
)
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
) ,∀i. (23)
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We note that the solution for the monopolist newsvendor problem under the relative regret
minimization criterion can be obtained by letting oij ≡ 0,∀i, j, resulting inQNVi = piAiBi(pi−ci)Ai+ciBi .
Clearly, the Nash equilibrium solution preserves the basic form of this solution but expands the
support of demand distribution: instead of [Ai, Bi] we have
[
Ai, B
E
i
]
. This generalization is
similar to the outcome of the absolute regret minimization, and it is intuitively appealing. One
can easily verify that Q∗i ≥ QNVi , ∀i, so that competitive newsvendors stock more inventory
than in the monopoly case because they face demand distribution with the higher upper bound
(which now accounts for spillovers). Although the solution in (23) is intuitive, it is still given in
an implicit form because equilibrium stocking quantities appear both on the left- and right-hand
side of the optimality conditions. As in the absolute regret minimization problem, we can obtain
simpler solutions in two special cases.
Proposition 9 (a) If
piAi ≤ ciBi
1 + Bi −Ai∑
j 6=i oij
cjBj(Bj−Aj)
(pj−cj)Aj+cjBj
 , ∀i, (24)
then Q∗i ≤ Bi and the Nash equilibrium is defined by the following system of nonlinear
equations:
Q∗i =
piAi
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )
)
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )
) ,∀i. (25)
Furthermore, the Nash equilibrium is unique.
(b) There exists at least one newsvendor i0 such that Q∗i0 ≤ Bi0.
(c) Suppose the game is symmetric so that Ai = A, Bi = B, ci = c, pi = p, and oij =
γ/(N − 1), ∀i, j. Then, the unique Nash equilibrium is given by
Q∗i =
(1 + γ) (pA+ cB)− cA−
√
((1 + γ) (pA+ cB)− cA)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
2γc
. (26)
In (a), we provide simple conditions ensuring that the equilibrium stocking quantity does
not exceed the upper bound on the primary demand distribution. Similar to the absolute
regret minimization case, these conditions are easily satisfied if substitution proportions oij
are relatively small. The difference is that, when relative regret is minimized, this condition
may not even depend on the substitution fraction. To explain why, notice that, when pi/ci <
Bi/Ai, condition (24) trivially holds. Intuitively, when pi/ci < Bi/Ai, support of the demand
distribution is relatively wide (Bi/Ai is high) and the profit margin is relatively small (pi/ci is
small). Thus, no matter how big demand overflow due to competition may be, the newsvendor
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will never stock more than Bi. This is the unique feature of the relative regret minimization
problem because the regret in this case is measured relative to the baseline. However, unlike in
the absolute regret minimization case, this condition is not sufficient to obtain an equilibrium
solution in a closed form: it transforms only nonlinear and non-smooth optimality conditions
(23) into nonlinear but smooth optimality conditions (25) which can easily be solved numerically
and in some cases analytically. Moreover, in this case the Nash equilibrium is unique. In (b) we
see that condition (24) is always satisfied for at least one newsvendor because all newsvendors
taken together would not stock more than the upper bound on the aggregate demand. Finally,
when all newsvendors are symmetric, (a) and (b) together imply that (25) is the unique solution
which, because of the symmetry assumption, becomes a simple equation that we solve in closed
form. When there are two newsvendors in the game, we provide a closed-form solution for
arbitrary cost and revenue parameters as shown below.
For i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, define
oij =

(
(pj − cj)Aj + cjBj
cjBj(Bj −Aj)
)(
ciBi(Bi −Ai)
piAi − ciBi
)
, if
pi
ci
>
Bi
Ai
,
∞, otherwise,
α+i =
EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij +
√
(EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij)2 + 4EiojiGiEj
2Eioji
,
α−i =
EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij −
√
(EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij)2 + 4EiojiGiEj
2Eioji
,
where Ei = (pi/ci − 1)Ai + Bi + oij(Bj − pj/cjAj), and Gi = pi/ci(pi/ci − 1)A2i . As it is easy
to see, since oij ≤ 1 and oji ≤ 1, oij > oij and oji > oji cannot both hold.
Further, for i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, define
Qα+m =
pmAm
cm
+ α+m,m = 1, 2,
Qα−m =
pmAm
cm
+ α−m,m = 1, 2,
QNVi =
piAiBi
(pi − ci)Ai +Bi ,
Qβi =
piAi (Bi ((pj − cj)Aj + cjBj) + oijcjBj(Bj −Aj))
((pi − ci)Ai + ciBi) ((pj − cj)Aj + cjBj) + cicjoijBj(Bj −Aj) .
Proposition 10 Let N = 2, i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j.
(a) Suppose that oij > o¯ji and oji ≤ o¯ji. Then (Qβi , QNVj ) is the unique Nash equilibrium.
(b) Suppose that oij ≤ o¯ij and oji ≤ o¯ji. Then for m = 1, 2, α+m ≤ 0 and pmAmcm + α+m ≤ Bm,
(Qα+i , Q
α+
j ) is a Nash equilibrium. Also, for m = 1, 2, α
−
m ≤ 0 and pmAmcm + α−m ≤ Bm,
(Qα−i , Q
α−
j ) is a Nash equilibrium.
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(c) Suppose that oij ≤ o¯ij and oji ≤ o¯ji. Then (Qα−i , Qα−j ) is the unique Nash equilibrium if
Bj ≥ pjAj
cj
and oij ≤
(pici − 1)Ai +Bi
pjAj
cj
−Bj
(27)
hold simultaneously when i = 1 and j = 2 and when i = 2 and j = 1.
Similar to the result of Proposition 6 for the absolute regret minimization, we derive condi-
tions for the existence of different equilibria using thresholds for substitution fractions. In the
case of relative regret we must define thresholds more complexly because, as we saw in the previ-
ous proposition, conditions for Q∗i < Bi may not depend on the substitution fractions. To reflect
this observation, we let oij = ∞ (so that oij ≤ oij is trivially satisfied) when pi/ci ≤ Bi/Ai.
With the exception of this caveat, the equilibrium solution for the duopoly is similar to the
absolute regret minimization case. When both substitution fractions are small enough as in
Proposition 10 (b), competing newsvendors select stocking quantities that are higher than the
newsvendor solution QNVi but lower than the upper bound on the primary demand. If, however,
substitution fractions are asymmetric as in Proposition 10 (a) (one higher and one lower than
the thresholds), then in a typical Nash equilibrium (Qβi , Q
NV
j ), one competitor to stocks more
than the upper bound on demand causing the other competitor stock at exactly the newsvendor
solution amount.
For asymmetric newsvendor competition with N = 2, unlike for the absolute regret criterion,
we are unable to prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the relative regret criterion.
However, under the relative regret criterion, uniqueness can be guaranteed for some special
cases; see Proposition 10 (a) and (c). A particular observation from Proposition 10 (c) is that
(Qα−i , Q
α−
j ) is the unique Nash equilibrium when both oij and oji are sufficiently small. In
our computational experiments, we have not identified any examples that had multiple Nash
equilibria or any examples that had (Qα+i , Q
α+
j ) as a Nash equilibrium.
6.2 Relative Ex-Ante Regret
We define the relative ex-ante regret for newsvendor i as
δeai (Q,F) =
maxbQi≥0
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
, (28)
where Πi(Qi,Q−i,F) is defined in Section 5.1. Using this definition, we further define the
minimax relative ex-ante regret problem for newsvendor i as
min
Qi≥0
(
max
F∈D
(δeai (Q,F))
)
. (29)
Proposition 11 concisely states the solution to (29):
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Proposition 11 There exists a Nash equilibrium solution to the minimax relative ex-ante regret
problem satisfying Q∗i =
piAiB
E
i
(pi−ci)Ai+BEi ci
. Moreover, the maximin relative ex-post problem (22)
and the minimax ex-ante regret problem (29) are equivalent.
As is evident from the last result, the relative ex-ante regret minimization problem is equiva-
lent to the relative ex-post regret minimization problem and therefore all results for the relative
ex-post regret minimization game (Propositions 8-10) will be valid for the relative ex-ante regret
minimization game.
7 Numerical Comparison of Different Approaches
In this section, we numerically compare all robust approaches analyzed in the previous
sections with the expected profit optimization approach. The goal is to identify the robust
approach that results in solutions that are close to the expected profit maximization approach
while using limited demand information. We begin by focusing on a symmetric game. The
values of problem parameters for both newsvendors for our basic example are: A = 20, B = 70,
p = 20, c = 10, and γ = 0.5. We assume that the demands for both newsvendors are uniform.
We used four different optimization criteria: maximizing the expected profit (Exp-Rev),
minimizing the maximum absolute regret (denoted Abs-Reg), minimizing the maximum relative
regret (Rel-Reg), and maximizing the worst-case profit (Maximin). For each of four criteria,
we calculated values for four performance measures: order quantities (Solution), the expected
profit (ExpRev), the absolute regret (AbsReg), and the relative regret (RelReg). Using the
parameters above as a base scenario, we then vary support of the demand distribution, retail
price, and the substitution parameter. To be concise, we summarize results of these numerical
experiments in the Appendix (Table 1 describes parameter changes and Table 2 describes results)
and only highlight the main observations here.
Naturally, the newsvendor can achieve the highest expected profit among all criteria if he/she
orders based on the Exp-Rev criterion. We observe that the Abs-Reg approach performs very
well, i.e., it leads to the Nash equilibrium order quantities and profits which are very close to
the Exp-Rev approach even though this method uses only demand support information. The
performance of the Rel-Reg approach is considerably worse but can still be called satisfactory.
In contrast, the Maximin approach performs poorly due to its overly conservative nature.
To obtain further insights into the performance of all four robust approaches, we conducted
a detailed sensitivity analysis of our results with respect to the changes in the values of the
price, the demand support and the overflow rate. In particular, in Figure 1 we display the
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computational results for the four performance measures obtained by systematically varying
the product price from 20 to 30 units while keeping all other parameters constant as in our
basic example. These four figures reflect that, no matter how problem parameters change, the
absolute regret minimization approach still performs remarkably close to the expected profit
maximization, while the relative regret minimization is a distant second (indeed, when it comes
to the optimal order quantity, the gap is quite large). The worst-case approach performs much
worse largely because the optimal order quantity for it does not change with price. It is
interesting to see that for methods other than Maximin, the (absolute or relative) regret is quite
insensitive to price increases since the order quantity depends on price.
Figure 1: Price sensitivity analysis for a symmetric game.
Figure 2 illustrates the sensitivity of our results with respect to changes in the upper bound
of demand support. Since the equilibrium for the Maximin approach is insensitive to the upper
bound of demand distribution, its performance quickly worsens as B increases. Likewise, the
equilibrium order quantity for the Rel-Reg case appears to be quite insensitive to changes in
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Figure 2: Demand support sensitivity analysis for a symmetric game.
the upper bound for parameters that we use, and therefore this approach performs considerably
worse relative to expected profit maximization. Thus, the increase in the upper value of the
demand support interval has a consistent positive impact on both the order quantities and the
expected profit for Exp-Rev and Abs-Reg, but not on Maximin or Rel-Reg. The absolute regret
minimization approach once again results in only a moderate decrease in profits and very small
deviation in order quantities.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the effects of changes in the overflow rate on our performance mea-
sures. It appears that, for very large overflow rates, the performance of the absolute regret
minimization approach worsens, but it is still quite good. On the other hand, the other two
approaches perform consistently poorly. Moreover, the impact of the overflow rate on all per-
formance measures is quite insignificant: all curves are nearly flat.
To ensure that these numerical results are robust, we conducted numerical experiments for
asymmetric games as well as for other demand distributions (triangular and truncated normal).
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Figure 3: Demand overflow rate sensitivity analysis for a symmetric game.
We report that our observations were consistent with the numerical experiments presented above:
the Abs-Reg approach provided consistently good performance even for other demand distrib-
ution and asymmetric problem parameters. In the Appendix, we illustrate these observations
using the truncated Normal demand distribution. We make only three observations about these
results here. First, both newsvendors have slightly higher order quantities under the Abs-Reg
approach and significantly lower order quantities under the Rel-Reg approach than under the
Exp-Rev approach. Second, as our theoretical results indicate, one newsvendor may stock more
than the upper bound of the support of his/her demand, which never occurs in a monopoly
or symmetric game setting. Third, in a monopoly setting, the absolute regret is always non-
negative because no method can perform better in terms of the expected profit than the method
of maximizing the expected profit. However, due to demand overflow and competition, one
newsvendor can generate higher-than-expected profits under the Rel-Reg approach than under
the Exp-Rev approach because the latter approach is known to result in inventory overstocking
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relative to the centralized solution (Netessine and Rudi [20]).
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied the newsvendor competition model under several robust opti-
mization criteria: the absolute regret minimization, the relative regret minimization, and the
worst-case scenario. We have established the existence results for Nash equilibria for robust
newsvendor games and derived closed-form solutions for special cases, particularly for duopoly
games. The analytical results and computational experiments allow us to better understand the
consequences of robust solutions when limited information about demand is available. An inter-
esting result that we have obtained is that the ex-ante and ex-post versions of the competitive
newsvendor problem are equivalent under the worst-case or the absolute regret or the relative
regret criterion when the only available information is the demand support. Note that the
ex-ante and ex-post newsvendor problems are no longer necessarily equivalent when additional
information other than the demand support is available. For example, in Theorem 1 Yue et al.
[33] prove that the maximum regret is achieved at a two-point probability distribution. Our
results indicate that, from a practical standpoint, the absolute regret minimization approach
both is analytically tractable and results in solutions that are very close to the expected profit
maximization even though it uses only information about support of demand distribution.
This is the first attempt to analyze newsvendor competition through stock-out-based sub-
stitution. We anticipate a lot of new research in the area of robust optimization and robust
competition. One possible future research topic is to include more information about demand
such as its mean and standard deviation. Recently, Perakis and Roels [25, 24] and Zhu, Zhang
and Ye [34] have investigated robust newsvendor optimization with such additional demand
information in a monopolistic setting. Another interesting direction would be to extend our
analysis by investigating a centralized system that includes all newsvendors under robust per-
formance criteria. Our preliminary results indicate that this is a very hard problem that is
unlikely to result in any closed-form solutions.
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Appendix to “Robust Newsvendor Competition”
Proof of Proposition 1.
(a) Follows from Proposition 3 of Netessine and Rudi [20].
(b) Let f(x) be the probability distribution of the demand for both newsvendors. Then
P (D1 ≤ Q)− P (D1 < Q < D1 + γ(D2 −Q)+) = p− c
p
(A1)
is equivalent to
P (D1 ≤ Q)− P ((D1 < Q < D1 + γ(D2 −Q)) ∩D2 > Q) = p− c
p
. (A2)
We claim that Q ≤ B. Otherwise, P (D1 ≤ Q) = p−cp , which implies that Q ≤ B, a contradiction.
The latest equation is in turn equivalent to one of the following two equations:∫ Q
A
f(s)ds−
∫ B
Q
f(v)
(∫ Q
Q−γ(v−Q)
f(s)ds
)
dv =
p− c
p
, (A3)
when Q+ Q−Aγ ≥ B, and∫ Q
A
f(s)ds−
∫ Q
A
f(s)
(∫ B
Q+Q−s
γ
f(v)dv
)
ds =
p− c
p
, (A4)
when Q+ Q−Aγ < B.
We first solve (A3). If D1 has a uniform distribution, then f(x) = 1B−A for x ∈ [A,B];
otherwise, f(x) = 0. The equilibrium equation (A3) becomes:
p− c
p
=
Q−A
B −A −
∫ B
Q
1
B −A
(
Q− (Q− γ(s−Q))
B −A
)
ds
=
Q−A
B −A −
γ
(B −A)2
∫ B−Q
0
tdt
=
Q−A
B −A −
γ
2(B −A)2 (B −Q)
2, (A5)
which is a quadratic equation: γ2Y
2 − Y − cp = 0, where Y = Q−BB−A . Let
Ŷ =
1 +
√
1 + 2γcp
γ
, Y˜ =
1−
√
1 + 2γcp
γ
. (A6)
Then Ŷ and Y˜ are two solutions of the quadratic equation. Since Q ≤ B according to our earlier
claim, Q obtained from Ŷ is not a valid Nash equilibrium. Therefore, Q˜ = B+(B−A)1−
q
1+ 2γc
p
γ
is the only possible Nash equilibrium when Q˜+
eQ−A
γ ≥ B and Q˜ ≤ B.
1
It is easy to prove that A ≤ Q˜ ≤ B. Let us show that Q˜ + eQ−Aγ ≥ B if and only if
(2 + 3γ)p ≥ 2c(1 + γ)2 holds. Indeed,
(2 + 3γ)p ≥ 2c(1 + γ)2 ⇔ 2pγ + 3pγ2 ≥ 2cγ + 4cγ2 + 2γ3
⇔ p+ 4pγ + 4pγ2 ≥ 2cγ + 4cγ2 + 2γ3 + p+ 2pγ + pγ2
⇔ p(1 + 2γ)2 ≥ (1 + γ)2(p+ 2cγ)
⇔ 1 + 2γ ≥ (1 + γ)
√
p+ 2γc
p
⇔ 1−
√
1 +
2γc
p
+ 1 +
1−
√
1 + 2γcp
γ
≥ 0
⇔ (B −A)
1−
√
1 + 2γcp
γ
+ (B −A)
1 +
1−
q
1+ 2γc
p
γ
γ
≥ 0
⇔ Q˜+ Q˜−A
γ
≥ B. (A7)
We next solve (A4).
p− c
p
=
Q−A
B −A −
1
(B −A)2
∫ Q
A
(
B −Q− Q− s
γ
)
ds
=
Q−A
B −A −
(
(B −Q− Qγ )(Q−A) + Q
2−A2
2γ
)
(B −A)2
=
(Q−A)2
(B −A)2 (1 +
1
2γ
). (A8)
The valid solution of the above equation is
Q̂ = A+ (B −A)
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
. (A9)
We now check that Q̂+
bQ−A
γ < B holds if and only if the condition (2 + 3γ)p < 2c(1 + γ)
2
is satisfied.
(2 + 3γ)p < 2c(1 + γ)2 ⇔ 2p+ 2pγ2 + 4pγ − 2c(1 + γ)2 < pγ + 2pγ2
⇔ 2(p− c)(1 + γ)2 < pγ(1 + 2γ)
⇔ 2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
(1 + γ)2
γ2
< 1
⇔
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
(1 +
1
γ
) < 1
⇔ (B −A)
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
(1 +
1
γ
) < B −A
2
⇔ A+ (B −A)
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
+
1
γ
(B −A)
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
< B
⇔ Q̂+ 1
γ
(
A+ (B −A)
√
2γ(p− c)
(1 + 2γ)p
−A
)
< B
⇔ Q̂+ 1
γ
(Q̂−A) < B. (A10)
Hence either (Q˜, Q˜) or (Q̂, Q̂) must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium, but both cannot be Nash
equilibria at the same time, thus proving that the newsvendor game has a unique symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(a) For any fixed F, it is clear that Πi(Q,F) is an increasing and linear affine function
over the interval [0, Ai], a concave function over the interval [Ai, BEi ], and a decreasing and
linear affine function over the interval [BEi ,+∞]. Let g(Qi,Q−i) = minF∈D Πi(Q,F). Then
g(Qi,Q−i) ≤ g(Ai,Q−i) for any Qi ≤ Ai and g(Qi,Q−i) ≤ g(BEi ,Q−i) for any Qi ≥ BEi . The
desired result follows.
(b) Note that the support for random variable Dj is [Aj , Bj ]. It follows that the support for
DEi is [Ai, B
E
i ]. For any probability distribution F,
−ciQi + piEF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
] ≥ −ciQi + piEF [min(Ai, Qi)] = −ciQi + pimin(Ai, Qi). (A11)
On the other hand, when the demand for newsvendor i is of a discrete probability distribution
with a unit impulse at Ai,
−ciQi + piEF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
]
= −ciQi + pimin(Ai, Qi), (A12)
which shows that the optimal value for the inner minimization problem is achieved at F such
that for all i, Fi is of a discrete probability distribution with a unit impulse at Ai.
(c) From the result of part (a), the objective function for both (5) and (6) is −ciQi +
pimin(Ai, Qi). Obviously, Q∗i = Ai is the unique optimal solution for both (5) and (6). There-
fore, the ex-ante maximin and ex-post maximin problems are equivalent. In particular, both
problems have the same Nash equilibrium solutions.
Proof of Lemma 1.
(a) Because the support of Di is [Ai, Bi], the support of DEi is [Ai, B
E
i ]. Since pi > ci > 0,
it is easy to verify that with respect to Q̂i, Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F) is an increasing and linear affine
function in the interval [0, Ai], concave in [Ai, BEi ], and a decreasing and linear affine function
in [BEi ,+∞). Hence the optimal value of the relevant maximization problem can be attained
at a point in the interval [Ai, BEi ], and of course can be attained at a point in a larger interval
[Ai, BEi ].
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(b) Let g(Qi,Q−i) = maxF∈D∆eai (Q,F). We need to prove only that g(Qi,Q−i) ≥ g(Ai,Q−i)
if 0 ≤ Qi ≤ Ai, and g(Qi,Q−i) ≥ g(BEi ,Q−i) if Qi ≥ BEi . It follows from (a) that for any
0 ≤ Qi ≤ Ai, Πi(Qi,Q−i,F) ≤ Πi(Ai,Q−i,F), which shows that g(Qi,Q−i) ≥ g(Ai,Q−i).
Similarly we can prove that g(Qi,Q−i) ≥ g(BEi ,Q−i) if Qi ≥ BEi .
Proof of Proposition 3.
Let ∆ = min(DEi , Q̂i)−min(DEi , Qi) as a function of DEi for any fixed Qi and Q̂i. Assume
Qi ≤ Q̂i. It is clear that ∆ = 0 if DEi ≤ Qi ≤ Q̂i, ∆ = DEi − Qi if Qi ≤ DEi ≤ Q̂i, and
∆ = Q̂i−Qi if Qi ≤ Q̂i ≤ DEi . It shows that ∆ ≤ Q̂i−Qi and ∆ attains the maximum Q̂i−Qi
when DEi = Q̂i.
Assume Q̂i ≤ Qi. We have that ∆ = 0 if DEi ≤ Q̂i ≤ Qi, ∆ = Q̂i −DEi if Q̂i ≤ DEi ≤ Qi,
and ∆ = Q̂i −Qi if Q̂i ≤ Qi ≤ DEi . It follows that ∆ ≤ 0 and ∆ attains the maximum 0 when
DEi = Q̂i.
Let F be any joint probability distribution for the demand of all newsvendors. Since Ai ≤
Q̂i ≤ BEi and for all j, Aj ≤ Qj ≤ BEj , it is easy to choose appropriate values for D̂i and
D̂j for j 6= i for the joint probability distribution F̂ such that Q̂i = D̂i +
∑
j 6=i oij(D̂j − Qj)+.
Clearly, DEi generated from the joint probability distribution F̂ is of a unit impulse probability
distribution with mass at Q̂i.
By the above arguments on ∆, we show that
EF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
− EF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
]
= EbF [∆]
≤ EbF
[
Q̂i −min(Q̂i, Qi)
]
= EbF
[
Q̂i
]
− EbF
[
min(Q̂i, Qi)
]
= EbF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
− EbF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
]
.
This implies that F̂ is an optimal solution for the inner maximization problem of the minimax
absolute ex-ante regret problem (10). This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.
(a) Note that the objective function for the outer maximization problem becomes
ci(Qi − Q̂i) + pi(Q̂i −min(Q̂i, Qi)) =
 ci(Qi − Q̂i) Q̂i ≤ Qi,ci(Qi − Q̂i) + pi(Q̂i −Qi), Q̂i > Qi, (A13)
which is a piecewise and convex function with respect to Q̂i. Therefore either Ai or BEi is an
optimal solution for the outer maximization problem, and the objective function for the outer
minimization problem is
max
(
ci(Qi −Ai), (ci − pi)(Qi −BEi )
)
, (A14)
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which is a piecewise and convex function with respect to Qi. The optimal value of the mini-
mization problem can only be obtained at the intersection of two straight lines y = ci(Qi −Ai)
and y = (ci − pi)(Qi −BEi ), and this intersection is Q∗i = cipiAi +
pi−ci
pi
BEi . Clearly, this optimal
solution Q∗i is unique. The result follows.
(b) According to the proof of part (a), newsvendor i solves the following minimization prob-
lem
min
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
(
max
(
ci(Qi −Ai), (ci − pi)(Qi −BEi )
))
, (A15)
which has a convex and piecewise linear objective function and a compact and convex strategy
space {Qi : Ai ≤ Qi ≤ BEi }. By Theorem 1 of Rosen [27], the newsvendor game has a Nash
equilibrium. The result in (12) follows from part (a).
Proof of Proposition 5.
(a) We first prove by contradiction that for any i, Q∗i ≤ Bi. Assume for some m, Q∗m > Bm.
By (12), we have
Q∗m =
cm
pm
Am +
(
1− cm
pm
)Bm +∑
j 6=m
omj(Bj −Q∗j )+
 . (A16)
Consequently,
Bm <
cm
pm
Am + (1− cm
pm
)
Bm +∑
j 6=m
omj(Bj −Q∗j )+
 , (A17)
which is equivalent to
cm
pm
(Bm −Am) <
(
1− cm
pm
)∑
j 6=m
omj(Bj −Q∗j )+
=
(
1− cm
pm
) ∑
j 6=m,Bj>Q∗j
omj(Bj −Q∗j ) +
∑
j 6=m,Bj≤Q∗j
omj × 0
 . (A18)
Let QNVi = (ci/pi)Ai + (1− ci/pi)Bi. It follows that
cm
pm
(Bm −Am) <
(
1− cm
pm
) ∑
j 6=m,Bj>Q∗j
omj(Bj −QNVj ) +
∑
j 6=m,Bj>Q∗j
omj
cj
pj
(Bj −Aj)

=
(
1− cm
pm
) ∑
j 6=m,Bj>Q∗j
omj
cj
pj
(Bj −Aj) +
∑
j 6=m,Bj>Q∗j
omj
cj
pj
(Bj −Aj)

=
(
1− cm
pm
)∑
j 6=m
omj
cj
pj
(Bj −Aj)

≤ cm
pm
(Bm −Am), (A19)
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where the last inequality follows from the condition of this proposition. This is a contradiction.
Hence for any i, Q∗i ≤ Bi. Moreover, the result in (14) is a direct consequence of (12).
To prove the uniqueness of a solution for (12), we need to prove only that the coefficient
matrix of (12) is strictly diagonally column-dominant and hence non-singular. The strictly
diagonal column-dominance property follows from the fact that for all i, 1− cipi < 1 and
∑
j 6=i oji ≤
1.
(b) Suppose Q∗i > Bi holds for all i. Since (Q
∗
1, · · · , Q∗n) is a Nash equilibrium of the
newsvendor game, by (12), we have that for all i,
Q∗i =
ci
pi
Ai +
(
1− ci
pi
)
(Bi +
∑
j 6=i
oij × 0) ≤ Bi, (A20)
where the last inequality follows from the fact that for all i, Ai ≤ Bi and ci ≤ pi. This is a
contradiction so that Q∗i > Bi for all i does not hold.
(c) Due to the symmetry, the condition in (a) holds. Therefore, there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium satisfying (12) which can be easily found after symmetry is assumed.
Proof of Proposition 6.
(a) It follows from Proposition 5 that Q∗1 ≤ B1 and Q∗2 ≤ B2. By Proposition 5 (a), the
unique Nash equilibrium (Q∗1, Q∗2) satisfies the equation (12), which leads to (17).
(b) Let us prove one case where i = 1 and j = 2. Since o12 ≤ o¯12 holds, Q∗1 ≤ B1. We now
prove that Q∗2 > B2. Indeed, suppose that Q∗2 ≤ B2. Then, we have
Q∗2 =
c2
p2
A2 +
(
1− c2p2
)
B2 +
(
1− c2p2
)
c1
p1
o21(B1 −A1)−
(
1− c1p1
)(
1− c2p2
)
o12o21B2
1−
(
1− c1p1
)(
1− c2p2
)
o12o21
≤ B2,
(A21)
which is equivalent to
c2
p2
A2 +
(
1− c2
p2
)
B2 +
(
1− c2
p2
)
c1
p1
o21(B1 −A1)−
(
1− c1
p1
)(
1− c2
p2
)
o12o21B2
≤ B2 −
(
1− c1
p1
)(
1− c2
p2
)
o12o21B2. (A22)
The latter is, in turn, equivalent to o21 ≤ o¯21, which contradicts the given condition that
o21 > o¯21. Therefore, we have proved that Q∗2 > B2. In view of the fact that Q∗1 ≤ B1 and
Q∗2 > B2, the system of non-smooth equations (12) becomes
Q∗1 =
c1
p1
A1 +
p1 − c1
p1
B1,
Q∗2 =
c2
p2
A2 +
p2 − c2
p2
(B2 + o21(B1 −Q∗1)) , (A23)
which can be solved to establish (18).
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Proof of Proposition 7.
The feasible region for the outer minimizer problem of (20) is Qi ≥ 0 but, as in the argument
we made in Lemma 1 for the minimax absolute ex-ante regret problem, this feasible region can
be replaced by Ai ≤ Qi ≤ BEi without loss of generality. Furthermore, it is straightforward to
show that
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)− Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D) =
 (pi − ci)(DEi −Qi), DEi ≥ Qi,ci(Qi −DEi ), DEi < Qi. (A24)
Hence, for any fixedQ, Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)−Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D) is a piecewise linear and convex function
with respect to DEi , so that the optimal value for the inner maximization problem is achieved
at either the minimum or the maximum possible value for DEi , which is either Ai or B
E
i ,
respectively. Given this result, the minimax absolute ex-post regret problem becomes:
min
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
(
max
(
(pi − ci)(BEi −Qi), ci(Qi −Ai)
))
. (A25)
It is easily verified that the minimization problem is a piecewise linear and convex function
with respect to Qi, and the optimal solution corresponds to the intersection of two lines y =
(pi − ci)(BEi − Qi) and y = ci(Qi − Ai) provided that this intersection is within the interval[
Ai, B
E
i
]
. Solving these two equations simultaneously, we obtain the optimal solution.
The equivalence between absolute ex-post and ex-ante regret problems (20) and (8) follows
directly from (A14) and (A25).
Proof of Proposition 8.
It is straightforward to verify that the quantity of interest can be expressed as follows:
Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D)
Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D)
=

piD
E
i −ciQi
(pi−ci)DEi
, DEi ≤ Qi,
Qi
DEi
, DEi > Qi.
(A26)
From this expression we observe that Ωi(Qi,Q−i,D)/Ωi(Q̂i,Q−i,D) is an increasing function of
DEi when D
E
i ≤ Qi and a decreasing function when DEi > Qi. Therefore, the optimal value for
the inner minimization problem is achieved by selecting a probability distribution with a single
mass-point Ai when DEi ≤ Qi or a single mass-point BEi when DEi > Qi. Consequently, the
outer maximization problem simplifies to:
max
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
(
min
(
piAi − ciQi
(pi − ci)Ai ,
Qi
BEi
))
. (A27)
This is a piecewise linear and concave objective function with the optimal solution located at
the intersection of two straight lines y = piAi−ciQi(pi−ci)Ai and y =
Qi
BEi
subject to the intersection point
7
being within the interval [Ai, BEi ]. It is straightforward to verify that this optimal solution is
Q∗i =
piAiB
E
i
(pi − ci)Ai + ciBEi
, (A28)
which indeed lies in the interval [Ai, BEi ].
Now, according to Theorem 1 of [27], a Nash equilibrium exists if the objective function
for each player is concave with respect to her own strategy and continuous with respect to the
strategies of all newsvendors and the strategy space for each newsvendor is convex and compact.
According to (A27), each newsvendor’s problem is concave over a compact and convex strategy
space. The result follows.
Proof of Proposition 9.
(a) If piAi ≤ ciBi holds, then it follows from (23) that
Q∗i ≤
ciBi
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
)
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
) ≤ Bi. (A29)
If piAi ≤ ciBi does not hold, but (24) holds, then by (23), we have
Q∗i =
piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )+
) + piAi
ci
≤ piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −QNVj )
) + piAi
ci
=
piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij
cjBj(Bj−Aj)
(pj−cj)Aj+cjBj
) + piAi
ci
≤ piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
ciBi(Bi−Ai)
piAi−ciBi
) + piAi
ci
= −piAi − ciBi
ci
+
piAi
ci
= Bi, (A30)
where the first inequality is implied by the fact that QNVi ≤ Q∗i and the second inequality follows
from (24). Therefore Q∗i ≤ Bi. After combining the two conditions, we obtain the desired result.
To prove the uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, we only need to prove that the Jacobian matrix
of (23) is strictly diagonally row-dominant and hence non-singular. Since for all i, Q∗i ≤ Bi, the
+ operator can be removed from (23). Consequently, (23) is equivalent to the following system:(pi − ci)Ai + ciBi + ci∑
j 6=i
oijBj
Q∗i + piAi∑
j 6=i
oijQ
∗
j − ci
∑
j 6=i
oijQ
∗
j
Q∗i
= piAiBi + piAi
∑
j 6=i
oijBj ,∀i. (A31)
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Let J be the Jacobian matrix of the above system of nonlinear equations at the Nash equilibrium
point (Q∗1, · · · , Q∗N ). Then for any i and j 6= i,
Jii = piAi + ci(Bi −Ai) + ci
∑
j 6=i
oij(Bj −Q∗j ),
Jij = piAioij − cioijQ∗i . (A32)
Obviously, Jii > 0 since Q∗i ≤ Bi.
∑
j 6=i
Jij = piAi
∑
j 6=i
oij − ci
∑
j 6=i
oij
Q∗i ≤ piAi < Jii, (A33)
where the first inequality follows from the assumption that
∑
j 6=i oij ≤ 1. Thus, J is strictly
diagonally row-dominant at Q∗.
(b) Suppose Q∗i > Bi ∀i. By (23), we show that Q∗i = QNVi , which is less than or equal to
Bj because of the fact that QNVi ≤ Q∗i , which is a contradiction.
(c) It is easy to prove that Condition (24) is satisfied. If (Q∗1, · · · , Q∗N ) is a Nash equilibrium
for the newsvendor game, then Q∗i ≤ Bi for all i by the result in (a).
Suppose there exists a symmetric solution (Q∗1, · · · , Q∗N ) such that Q∗i = Q∗ for all i. Propo-
sition 8 shows that Q∗ is a solution of the following equation:
Q∗ =
pA(B + γ(B −Q∗))
(p− c)A+ c (B + γ(B −Q∗)) , (A34)
which is equivalent to the quadratic equation below:
γc(Q∗)2 + (cA− (1 + γ)pA− (1 + γ)cB)Q∗ + (1 + γ)pAB = 0. (A35)
Let ∆ be the discriminant of the above equation. Then
∆ = (cA− (1 + γ)pA− (1 + γ)cB)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
= ((1 + γ)pA+ (1 + γ)cB − cA)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
= (γpA+ (1 + γ)cB + pA− cA)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
≥ (γpA+ (1 + γ)cB)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
= (γpA− (1 + γ)cB)2 ≥ 0. (A36)
Therefore the above quadratic equation has a solution which is given by the quadratic formula:
Q∗ =
(1 + γ)pA+ (1 + γ)cB − cA±
√
((1 + γ)pA+ (1 + γ)cB − cA)2 − 4γ(1 + γ)pcAB
2γc
.
(A37)
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Because p > c and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, we have
(1 + γ)pA+ (1 + γ)cB − cA
2γc
≥ (1 + γ)cB
2γc
≥ B. (A38)
This shows that in the above quadratic formula, the minus sign must be taken because Q∗ ≤ B.
The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 10.
First let us prove that oij > o¯ij and oji > o¯ji do not hold simultaneously. If we suppose that
they do not, then we have
p1A1 > c1B1,
p2A2 > c2B2,
o12
c2B2(B2 −A2)
(p2 − c2)A2 + c2B2 >
c1B1(B1 −A1)
p1A1 − c1B1 ,
o21
c1B1(B1 −A1)
(p1 − c1)A1 + c1B1 >
c2B2(B2 −A2)
p2A2 − c2B2 . (A39)
Multiplying both sides of the last two inequalities and canceling some common terms, we obtain
o12o21(p1A1 − c1B1)(p2A2 − c2B2) > ((p1 − c1)A1 + c1B1) ((p2 − c2)A2 + c2B2) . (A40)
Since o12 ≤ 1 and o21 ≤ 1, the above inequality implies that
(p1A1 − c1B1)(p2A2 − c2B2) > (p1A1 + c1(B1 −A1)) (p2A2 + c2(B2 −A2)) , (A41)
which in turn shows that
p1A1p2A2 > p1A1p2A2, (A42)
because piAi > piAi − ciBi and ci(Bi − Ai) > 0 for i = 1, 2. This is a contradiction. Hence,
oij > o¯ij and oji > o¯ji cannot hold simultaneously.
(a) Suppose (Q∗i , Q
∗
j ) is a Nash equilibrium. We first prove that Q
∗
i > Bi and Q
∗
j ≤ Bj . The
statement that Q∗j ≤ Bj follows from Proposition 9 (a). Suppose Q∗i ≤ Bi. Note that oij > o¯ij
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implies that piAi > Bici. Then it follows from (23) and the fact that Q∗j ≤ Bj that
Q∗i =
piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )
) + piAi
ci
≤ Bi,
piA
2
i (1− pici )
(pi − ci)Ai + ci
(
Bi +
∑
j 6=i oij(Bj −Q∗j )
) ≤ −piAi + ciBi
ci
,
piA
2
i (pi − ci)
piAi − ciBi ≥ (pi − ci)Ai + ciBi + oijci(Bj −Qj),
ciBici(Bi −Ai)
piAi − ciBi ≥ oijci(Bj −Qj),
ciBi(Bi −Ai)
piAi − ciBi ≥ oij(Bj −Q
NV
j ),
ciBici(Bi −Ai)
piAi − ciBi ≥ oij
cjBj(Bj −Aj)
(pj − cj)Aj + cjBj ,
o¯ij ≥ oij ,
which is a contradiction.
Because Q∗i > Bi, equation (23) shows that Q
∗
j = Q
NV
j and Q
∗
i = Q
β
i . That is, (Q
β
i , Q
∗
j ) is
the unique Nash equilibrium.
(b) Suppose (Q∗i , Q
∗
j ) is a Nash equilibrium. Proposition 9 (a) proves that Q
∗
i ≤ Bi and
Q∗j ≤ Bj . Rearranging (23), we obtain:
Q∗i −
piAi
ci
= −
pi
ci
(pici − 1)A2i
(pici − 1)Ai +Bi + oijBj − oij(
pjAj
cj
)− oij(Q∗j − pjAjcj )
, (A43)
Q∗j −
pjAj
cj
= −
pj
cj
(pjcj − 1)A2j
(pjcj − 1)Aj +Bj + ojiB1 − oij(
piAi
ci
)− oji(Q∗i − piAici )
. (A44)
Using the definitions of Ei and Gi, we transform (A43) into
Eioji
(
Q∗i −
piAi
ci
)2
+ (Gioji −Gjoij − EiEj)
(
Q∗i −
piAi
ci
)
−GiEj = 0. (A45)
The roots of (A45) are given by
Q∗i =
piAi
ci
+
EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij ±
√
(EiEj −Gioji +Gjoij)2 + 4EiojiGiEj
2Eioji
. (A46)
Therefore, (Qα+1 , Q
α+
2 ) and (Q
α−
1 , Q
α−
2 ) are two candidates for (Q
∗
i , Q
∗
j ). For i = 1, 2, both
Qα+i ≤ Bi and Qα+i ≤ piAi/ci must hold in order for (Qα+1 , Qα+2 ) to be a valid Nash equilibrium,
and the same applies for (Qα−1 , Q
α−
2 ). The results follow.
(c) Suppose (27) holds simultaneously when both i = 1 and j = 2 and i = 2 and j = 1. Then
direct algebraic calculations show that Ei ≥ 0 and Ej ≥ 0, which imply that 4EiojiGiEj ≥ 0.
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Evidently, we conclude that α+i > 0 and α
+
j > 0. Consequently, Q
α+
i > Ajpi/ci and Q
α+
j >
Ajpj/cj . Hence (Qα+i , Q
α+
j ) is not a Nash equilibrium and (Q
α−
i , Q
α−
j ) is the unique Nash
equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 11.
First we will show that the optimal solution to the minimax ex-ante regret problem (29) can
be attained at a point in the interval [Ai, BEi ]. Indeed, Lemma 1 proves that the inner maximiza-
tion problem of (29) is equivalent to the same optimization problem with a smaller feasible region
Q̂i ∈ [Ai, BEi ]. Let g(Qi,Q−i) = maxF∈D (δeai (Q,F)). It is easy to prove that g(Qi,Q−i) ≥
g(Ai,Q−i) for any Qi ∈ [0, Ai]. It is also easy to prove that g(Qi,Q−i) ≥ g(BEi ,Q−i) for any
Qi ∈ [BEi ,+∞].
To simplify our analysis, we can further narrow down the feasible region of Q in the minimax
relative ex-ante regret problem. For convenience, we are presenting the following result in the
form of a lemma:
Lemma A1 Consider the problem:
min
Ai≤Qi≤min

BEi ,
piAi
ci

maxF∈D

max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)

 . (A47)
Then, problems (29) and (A47) are equivalent.
Proof. Let Qi = Ai. Then for any F, we have Πi(Qi,Q−i,F) ≥ (pi − ci)Ai, and
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
)
= max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
−ciQ̂i + piEF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
])
≤ max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
−ciQ̂i + piEF
[
min(BEi , Q̂i)
])
= max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
−ciQ̂i + piQ̂i
)
≤ (pi − ci)BEi . (A48)
This shows that when Qi = Ai,
max
F∈D
(δeai (Q,F)) ≤
BEi
Ai
. (A49)
Hence B
E
i
Ai
is a positive upper bound for the optimal objective function value of the minimax
relative ex-ante regret problem.
Suppose that Qi satisfies piAici ≤ Qi ≤ BEi . Choose a probability distribution F from D such
that the effect demand for newsvendor i has a unit impulse probability distribution with mass
at DEi =
ci
pi
Qi + ε, where ε is a sufficiently small and positive constant. Obviously Ai ≤ DEi ≤
Qi ≤ BEi . Then
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Πi(Qi,Q−i,F) = −ciQi + piDEi = −ciQi + pi(
ci
pi
Qi + ε) = piε, (A50)
and
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
)
= (pi − ci)DEi . (A51)
This shows that
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
>
BEi
Ai
, (A52)
and
max
F∈D

max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
 > BEiAi . (A53)
Since B
E
i
Ai
is an upper bound for the minimax relative ex-ante regret problem, any Qi satisfying
Qi ≥ piAici cannot be its optimal solution. That is, the feasible set of solutions to the minimax
relative ex-ante regret problem can be reduced to Ai ≤ Qi ≤ min(BEi , piAici ). This completes the
proof of lemma A1.
Now, since Πi(Qi,Q−i,F) ≥ −ciQi + piAi > 0 for any Qi ∈ [Ai, piAici ), we can also rewrite
(A47) into another equivalent problem
min
Ai≤Qi≤min

BEi ,
piAi
ci

(
max
F∈D
(
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
)))
. (A54)
Swapping the order of two inner maximization problems in the above formulation, we obtain
yet another equivalent optimization problem:
min
Ai≤Qi≤min

BEi ,
piAi
ci

(
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
max
F∈D
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
)))
. (A55)
To simplify the minimax relative ex-ante regret problem, we need an additional result:
Lemma A2 Suppose Ai ≤ Qi ≤ min(BEi , piAici ). Then
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
max
F∈D
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
))
= max
(
(pi − ci)Ai
−ciQi + piAi ,
BEi
Qi
)
. (A56)
Proof. Let δ = ci
bQi−pimin(DEi , bQi)
ciQi−pimin(DEi ,Qi)
as a function of DEi for any fixed Qi and Q̂i.
Assume Qi ≤ Q̂i. We have that
δ =

bQi
Qi
, if DEi ≥ Q̂i,
−ci bQi+piDEi
−ciQi+piQi , if Qi ≤ DEi < Q̂i,
−ci bQi+piDEi
−ciQi+piDEi
, if DEi < Qi.
(A57)
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δ attains the maximum at DEi = Q̂i. Similarly when Q̂i ≤ Qi, we have that
δ =

bQi
Qi
, if DEi ≥ Qi,
−ci bQi+pi bQi
−ciQi+piDEi
, if Q̂i ≤ DEi < Qi,
−ci bQi+piDEi
−ciQi+piDEi
, if DEi < Q̂i.
(A58)
δ attains the maximum at DEi = Ai.
Let F be any joint probability distribution for the demand of all newsvendors.
We now assume that Q ≤ Q̂i. Let F̂ be a particular joint probability distribution for the
demand of all newsvendors such that F̂i is a unit impulse probability distribution with mass at
D̂i and for any j 6= i, F̂j is a unit impulse probability distribution with mass at D̂j such that
Q̂i = D̂i +
∑
j 6=i oij(D̂j −Qj)+. Since Ai ≤ Q̂i ≤ BEi and for all j, Aj ≤ Q̂j ≤ BEj , it is easy to
choose appropriate values for D̂i and D̂j for j 6= i for the joint probability distribution F̂ such
that Q̂i = D̂i +
∑
j 6=i oij(D̂j −Qj)+. By the above arguments on δ, we have,
−ciQ̂i + piEF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
−ciQi + piEF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
] = EF
[
−ciQ̂i + pimin(DEi , Q̂i)
]
EF
[−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi)]
=
EF
[
δ(−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi))
]
EF
[−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi)]
≤ Q̂i
Qi
EF
[−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi)]
EF
[
(−ciQi + pimin(DEi , Qi))
]
=
Q̂i
Qi
=
Q̂i(pi − ci)
Qi(pi − ci)
=
−ciQ̂i + piEbF
[
min(DEi , Q̂i)
]
−ciQi + piEbF
[
min(DEi , Qi)
] .
This shows that F̂ is an optimal solution for the inner maximization problem of (A55) if Q ≤ Q̂i.
We next assume that Q > Q̂i. Let F̂ be a particular joint probability distribution for the
demand of all newsvendors such that F̂i is a unit impulse probability distribution with mass at
Ai and for any j 6= i, and F̂j a unit impulse probability distribution with mass at Aj . Similarly,
we can prove that F̂ is an optimal solution for the inner maximization problem of (A55) if
Q > Q̂i.
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Combining the above results and fixing any Qi, we have
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi
(
max
F∈D
(
Πi(Q̂i,Q−i,F)
Πi(Qi,Q−i,F)
))
= max
(
max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi , bQi≥Qi
(
Q̂i
Qi
)
, max
Ai≤ bQi≤BEi , bQi<Qi
(
−ciQ̂i + piAi
−ciQi + piAi
))
= max
(
BEi
Qi
,
(pi − ci)Ai
−ciQi + piAi
)
.
This completes the proof of Lemma A2.
By Lemma A2, the minimax relative ex-ante regret problem is converted into a simpler
minimization problem:
min
Ai≤Qi≤min

BEi ,
piAi
ci

(
max
(
(pi − ci)Ai
−ciQi + piAi ,
BEi
Qi
))
. (A59)
The objective function of (A59) takes the minimum of two pieces. The first piece is an increasing
function and the second piece is a decreasing function. Therefore, the optimal solution of (A59)
lies at the intersection of two curves y = (pi−ci)Ai−ciQi+piAi and y =
BEi
Qi
if this intersection is within
the interval [Ai,min(BEi ,
piAi
ci
)], and at either Ai or min(BEi ,
piAi
ci
) if this intersection is outside
of this interval. The intersection is
piAiB
E
i
(pi − ci)Ai +BEi ci
, (A60)
which lies within the interval [Ai,min(BEi ,
piAi
ci
)] following some simple calculations.
Similar to Proposition 7, we can prove that the maximin relative ex-post problem (22) and
the minimax ex-ante regret problem (29) are equivalent in the sense that the optimal solution
sets of both problems coincide. This follows from (A27), (A56), and the fact that the maximin
relative ex-post problem (22) can be equivalently formulated as the following minimax problem:
min
Ai≤Qi≤BEi
max
(
(pi − ci)Ai
−ciQi + piAi ,
BEi
Qi
)
.
Additional numerical results.
By varying values for problem parameters in our base example (Example 1), we first gener-
ated five additional test examples as shown in Table 1. The price and demand support are chosen
to vary in Examples 2 and 3 respectively. In Examples 4 and 5, the overflow rate is made either
very small or very large. Example 6 was selected to verify the result in Proposition 1, which
states that there are two possible types of Nash equilibria when maximizing the expected profit
for a known probability distribution of demand. Differences in problem parameters between
Example 1 and Examples 2-6 are highlighted in bold in Table 1.
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Example A B p c γ
1 20 70 20 10 0.5
2 20 70 40 10 0.5
3 20 120 20 10 0.5
4 20 70 20 10 0.1
5 20 70 20 10 1.0
6 20 70 15 10 0.95
Table 1: Data for test examples.
Computational results for Examples 1-6 are shown in Table 2, where each mini-table cor-
responds to one of the examples 1-6. In Table 2, for each of four criteria, we also report
three additional performance measures: the worst possible profit from all possible demand re-
alizations (WorstRev), the worst possible absolute regret from all possible demand realizations
(WorstAbsReg), and the worst possible relative regret from all possible demand realizations
(WorstRelReg).
We make several observations about the results in Table 2. It is not surprising to see that
the newsvendor can achieve the highest expected profit among all criteria if he/she orders based
on Exp-Rev. We observe that the Abs-Reg approach performs exceptionally well given that
the Nash equilibrium order quantities for this method are obtained using only demand support
information. The performance of the Rel-Reg approach drops below the level of Abs-Reg,
but can still be called satisfactory. In contrast, Maximin performed poorly due to its overly
conservative nature. Nevertheless, this conservative attitude allows a newsvendor to avoid the
worst results as can be seen from column WorstRev. Similarly, in terms of the worst absolute
(relative) regret, the Abs-Reg (Rel-Reg) approach is the best as shown in column WorstAbsReg
(WorstRelReg).
Results for Examples 2 and 3 demonstrate that the effects of the width of the demand support
and the change of the price are quite significant. On the other hand, the changes in the overflow
rate have a smaller impact as shown in the results for examples 4 and 5. The limited influence
of the overflow rate is due to the fact that the total number of “overflow” customers is not very
large, since each newsvendor sets his/her order quantity so as to ensure that most of his primary
customers get served by this very newsvendor. Example 6 differs from the first five examples in
that the Nash equilibrium order quantities are obtained using the second formula rather than
the first formula of (4), as defined in Proposition 1. We also note that in all examples, there is
a unique Nash equilibrium based on the criterion of maximizing the expected profits.
For asymmetric games, we generated three sets of 9 examples each that are variations of our
basic example. Here we chose to report the results based on the truncated normal distribution
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Method Solution ExpRev AbsReg RelReg WorstRev WorstAbsReg WorstRelReg
Exp-Rev 47.53 347.75 0.00 1.00 -75.26 337.12 -0.38
Abs-Reg 50.00 341.33 6.41 0.98 -100.00 300.00 -0.50
Rel-Reg 32.64 312.93 34.82 0.90 73.61 560.42 0.37
Maximin 20.00 200.00 147.75 0.58 200.00 750.00 0.21
Exp-Rev 58.20 1182.50 0.00 1.00 218.03 531.15 0.36
Abs-Reg 60.91 1170.87 11.62 0.99 190.91 409.09 0.32
Rel-Reg 46.18 1161.62 20.87 0.98 338.24 1072.07 0.56
Maximin 20.00 600.00 582.50 0.51 600.00 2250.00 0.21
Exp-Rev 75.05 495.49 0.00 1.00 -350.51 674.23 -1.75
Abs-Reg 80.00 482.67 12.83 0.97 -400.00 600.00 -2.00
Rel-Reg 35.61 349.75 145.74 0.71 43.91 1265.86 0.22
Maximin 20.00 200.00 295.49 0.40 200.00 1500.00 0.12
Exp-Rev 45.60 330.83 0.00 1.00 -55.96 268.45 -0.28
Abs-Reg 46.19 330.48 0.36 1.00 -61.90 261.90 -0.31
Rel-Reg 31.48 294.47 36.36 0.89 85.24 423.76 0.43
Maximin 20.00 200.00 130.83 0.60 200.00 550.00 0.27
Exp-Rev 49.29 359.73 0.00 1.00 -92.89 414.21 -0.46
Abs-Reg 53.33 341.98 17.75 0.95 -133.33 333.33 -0.67
Rel-Reg 33.67 323.06 36.67 0.90 63.32 726.65 0.32
Maximin 20.00 200.00 159.73 0.56 200.00 1000.00 0.17
Exp-Rev 43.37 165.13 0.00 1.00 -133.66 259.68 -1.34
Abs-Reg 44.68 162.47 2.66 0.98 -146.84 246.84 -1.47
Rel-Reg 27.51 135.82 29.31 0.82 24.92 414.30 0.25
Maximin 20.00 100.00 65.13 0.61 100.00 487.50 0.17
Table 2: Computational results for six test examples.
because similar results were obtained based for either the uniform or the triangular distributions.
In each of our tested examples, the mean of the demand distribution was set to be equal to
the middle value of the demand support, and the standard deviation was equal to the mean
multiplied by 0.4. In the first set of experiments we used parameters identical to Example 1
above but varied the product price for newsvendor 2 from 12 to 28. In the second set of
experiments we varied the upper bound of the demand support for newsvendor 2 from 30 to
110. In the third set of experiments we varied the overflow rate from newsvendor 2 to newsvendor
1 from 0.1 to 0.9.
Numerical results for the three sets of experiments are shown in Figures 4, 5, and 6, respec-
tively. In each of these 12 charts, three solid lines describe the performance measures of the three
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methods Exp-Rev, Abs-Reg, and Rel-Reg for newsvendor 1, and three dotted lines depict the
performance measures of the three methods Exp-Rev, Abs-Reg, and Rel-Reg for newsvendor 2.
To simplify presentation, we do not include numerical results for the Maximin approach because
of its inferior performance.
Figure 4: Price sensitivity analysis for an asymmetric game.
A close look at the top-left chart in Figure 4, where the Nash equilibria (or optimal order
quantities for both players) based on the three methods Exp-Rev, Abs-Reg, and Rel-Reg are
displayed as functions of the product price for the newsvendor 2, yields several observations.
First, as expected, newsvendor 2 exhibits lower order quantities than newsvendor 1 when p2 <
p1 = 20, and higher order quantities than newsvendor 1 when p2 > p1 = 20. Second, both
newsvendors have slightly higher order quantities under the Abs-Reg approach and significantly
lower order quantities under the Rel-Reg approach than under the Exp-Rev approach. Third,
newsvendor 1, as expected, changes his/her order quantity at a slower rate than newsvendor
2, when the price of newsvendor 2 is changed. Fourth, the Nash equilibrium based on the
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Figure 5: Demand support sensitivity analysis for an asymmetric game.
Abs-Reg approach provides a very good approximation for the Nash equilibrium under the
ExpRev approach, while the Nash equilibria under Rel-Reg are very different from those under
ExpRev. The observations made in the previous paragraph are further supported by the other
three charts in Figure 4. That is, in terms of either ExpRev or AbsReg or RelReg, the performance
of the Rel-Reg approach is very poor, and the performance of the Abs-Reg approach is excellent.
Most observations that we can make from Figures 5 and 6 are similar to those from Figure 4.
Here we reiterate two important facts. First, in terms of either ExpRev or AbsReg or RelReg,
method Abs-Reg performs very well and Rel-Reg performs badly compared with Exp-Rev. Sec-
ond, Abs-Reg results in slightly higher stocking quantities than the levels under Exp-Rev, and
Rel-Reg results in significantly lower stocking quantities than the levels under Exp-Rev. A fur-
ther interesting observation can be drawn from Figure 5 at B2 = 30. In this case, under the
Exp-Rev approach, newsvendors 1 and 2 stock approximately 45.42 and 27.65 units, respectively;
under the Abs-Reg approach, newsvendors 1 and 2 stock 45.00 and 31.25 units, respectively;
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Figure 6: Demand overflow rate sensitivity analysis for an asymmetric game.
and under the Rel-Reg approach, newsvendors 1 and 2 stock 31.19 and 28.47 units, respectively.
It is interesting to note that newsvendor 2 stocks more than the upper bound of the support of
his/her demand, which never occurs in a monopoly setting. It is even more interesting to see
that the absolute regrets for newsvendors 1 and 2 under Rel-Reg are 39.25 and -19.78, respec-
tively. In a monopoly setting, the absolute regret is always non-negative because no method
can perform better in terms of maximizing the expected profit than ExpRev. However, due to
the demand overflow and competition, newsvendor 2 can generate higher expected profits using
the equilibrium order quantity under the Rel-Reg approach than under the Exp-Rev approach.
The reason is that, as previous literature indicates, under competition newsvendors are likely
to overstock inventory. Since the Rel-Reg method results in lower stocking quantities, it may
lead to higher expected profits. This counterintuitive phenomenon is also reflected in the chart
of relative regret in Figure 5, where the relative regret for method Rel-Reg is 1.08 at B2 = 30.
On the other hand, it is well known that the relative regret is always less than or equal to 1 in
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a monopoly setting. In conclusion, unlike in a monopoly setting, in competition some newsven-
dors may achieve higher profits under a robust optimization criterion than under the criterion
of maximizing the expected profit.
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